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It has been argued that people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) exhibit facilitated 
attention to threat (early attentional capture) and difficulty disengaging from it (persistent 
attentional capture), which in turn produces prolonged compulsive behaviour (e.g., Rachman, 
2002). In turn, prolonged or repeated behavior reduces, rather than increases, confidence that 
things have been properly checked (e.g. van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). A recent study of visual 
attention to threat while checking a stove found that more attention to stove was associated with 
reduced certainty that the stove was off in the anxious controls, but not in the group with OCD 
(Bucarelli and Purdon, 2016). They also observed that people with OCD looked at threat stimuli 
(flammable items around the stove) less than did anxious controls, leading the authors to 
hypothesize that those with OCD may strategically avoid looking at threat in order to avoid 
checking long enough for it to degrade certainty. The current study was designed to further 
explore the relationship between visual attention to threat, checking behavior, and strategic 
avoidance. In this study, 29 participants high in checking behavior (HCB) and 30 participants 
low in checking behaviour (LCB) completed a stove-checking task while wearing an eye tracker, 
after which they rated their motivation to attend to, and avoid, threat items around the stove. The 
HCB group checked longer and were less certain after the task. They reported more subjective 
avoidance of threat items than the LCB group but actual visual attention to threat was not 
different between groups. Visual attention to threat did predict less certainty that harm was 
avoided in the HCB but not the LCB group. It is possible that people who have sub-clinical 
checking concerns do not yet have experience with prolonged checking and have not yet evolved 
actual strategic avoidance, despite a desire to avoid threat. 
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychological disorder, as defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders- Fifth Version (DSM-5; American 
Psychological Association, 2013). Individuals with OCD may have obsessions, compulsions, or, 
most commonly, both (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). Obsessions are distressing, 
intrusive, unwanted thoughts, images, or doubts that increase the anxiety of the experiencer 
(Jenike, 2004; Stein, 2002). Those with OCD attempt to ignore, suppress, or neutralize their 
obsessions with some other thought or action, called a compulsion. Compulsions are repetitive, 
excessive, interfering behaviours that serve to decrease the anxiety of the performer (Stein, 
2002). However, compulsions are excessive or not realistically connected to the event they are 
intended to prevent (i.e. eating food in groups of three to prevent poisoning; Abramowitz, 
Taylor, & McKay, 2009). Compulsions can be either observable behaviours, such as aligning the 
items in one’s home, or mental acts, such as thinking specific thoughts or counting in one’s head.  
OCD has a heterogeneous presentation (Mataix-Cols, Rosario-Campos, & Leckman, 
2005), making it a challenging disorder to study. The most common OCD symptoms are 
concerns about contamination paired with excessive hand-washing, or concerns about being 
responsible for harm paired with repetitive checking (Stein, 2002). Other categories include 
concerns about symmetry, hoarding, and intrusive aggressive, religious, or sexual thoughts 
(Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009; Mataix-Cols, Rosario-Campos, & Leckman, 2005; Stein, 
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2002). These symptom dimensions are mostly consistent across cultures (Abed & de Pauw, 
1999; Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). 
Severity, prevalence and course. The symptoms of OCD can lead to extreme 
impairment and have significant ramifications on one’s quality of life (Stein, 2002). Compulsive 
behaviours can take up a significant proportion of the OCD sufferer’s day, interfering with the 
ability to participate in work, social, or other activities. Those with OCD are less likely to be 
married and employed than those with other anxiety or mood disorders (Abramowitz, Taylor, & 
McKay, 2009). The lifetime prevalence of OCD has been estimated to be between 0.8%—3% in 
adults (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009; Bandelow et al., 2008; Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & 
Fineberg, 2006; Jenike, 2004; Stein, 2002). OCD can be present at any age throughout the 
lifespan, and may present as early as 6 years of age (Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & Fineberg, 2006). 
Males more often present in childhood than females (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). 
However, most commonly, the onset of OCD is in adolescence (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 
2009; Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & Fineberg, 2006). OCD can also begin shortly after a pregnancy, 
miscarriage, or giving birth (Stein, 2002). The course of the disorder is generally chronic 
(Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009; Stein, 2002), but may wax and wane with time (Jenike, 
2004).  
Risk factors. There are a number of risk factors for OCD, including genetic factors, 
neurobiological dysfunction, early childhood adversity, and stressors, such as traumas 
(Bandelow et al., 2008; Jenike, 2004). OCD is more common in family members of those with 
OCD (Jenike, 2004), and genetic factors are estimated to account for 27-47% of the variance in 
OCD symptoms (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). OCD may also be linked to an insult to 
the brain, such as a lesion, head injury, or infection (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009; 
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Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & Fineberg, 2006; Jenike, 2004). In addition, OCD has been strongly 
linked to abnormal activity levels in the orbitofrontal cortex, and less strongly linked to 
abnormalities in the anterior cingulate, striatum, lateral frontal and temporal cortices, amygdala, 
and insula (Mataix-Cols, Rosario-Campos, & Leckman, 2005). However, as with many other 
disorders, it is unclear whether these neurobiological irregularities serve as a risk factor for OCD, 
or are present as a result of OCD. 
Treatment. Many individuals with OCD are reluctant to seek help. This may be due in 
part to lack of insight, or shame and stigma (Jenike, 2004). In one sample, there was an average 
10-year delay in seeking treatment, and 17-year delay before receiving an appropriate treatment 
(Hollander et al., 1997). Lack of recognition by healthcare providers, as well as lack of access to 
care or affordable care, can both be barriers to receiving the appropriate treatment for OCD 
(Jenike, 2004; Stein, 2002). Fortunately, there are some effective treatments for OCD. NICE 
guidelines recommend evidence-based treatments, like Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy with 
Exposure and Response Prevention (CBT-ERP) and/or treatment with medication, like Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 
2005). Both psychological and pharmacological treatments have been shown to be effective 
(Bandelow et al., 2008), however CBT has been shown to have larger effect sizes than 
antidepressants (such as SSRIs; Foa et al., 2005; Ost, Havnen, Hansen, & Kvale, 2015). Some 
studies have found that CBT can have a longer duration of effectiveness after discontinuation of 
treatment, although results are mixed (Bandelow et al., 2008). The combination of CBT and 
medication is not superior to either alone (Foa et al., 2005; Ost, Havnen, Hansen, & Kvale, 
2015). Beyond CBT-ERP and medication, later lines of treatment may include transcranial 
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magnetic stimulation, deep brain stimulation, or surgical intervention (Abramowitz, Taylor, & 
McKay, 2009; Jenike, 2004). 
 
The cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
One of the most well-supported and oft-cited models for understanding OCD is the 
cognitive-behavioural model. This model begins with the assumption that everyone experiences 
unwanted thoughts with similar content to OCD obsessions (Byers, Purdon, & Clark, 1998; 
Rachman and de Silva, 1978), but those prone to developing obsessional problems react 
differently to these thoughts than those not prone (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). It is 
believed that those with OCD have six main beliefs which make them more susceptible to act on 
these thoughts than others: they place great importance on their thoughts, as well as their ability 
to control them; they have an inflated sense of responsibility to protect self and others from 
harm, are intolerant of uncertainty, have perfectionistic traits, and tend to overestimate threat 
(Jenike, 2004; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2001; Purdon & Chang, 2016; 
Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985; Stein, 2002; Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998). An individual 
who has these beliefs is more likely to appraise an unwanted thought as important, unacceptable, 
and threatening; thus, they are more likely to be distressed and more likely to engage the thought 
and make efforts to banish it, or to prevent the harm the thought suggests (Abramowitz, Taylor, 
& McKay, 2009). In addition, perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty may be related to the 
persistence of compulsions, as the individual seeks perfect certainty that harm has been avoided. 
There is evidence that those with obsessions use more criteria and more subjective criteria to 
decide when to end their compulsion (Salkovskis, 1998; Salkovskis, Millar, Gregory, & Wahl., 
2017). The individual may respond to an intrusion with any number of safety behaviours, 
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including performing compulsions, seeking reassurance, avoiding situations related to the 
obsessional thought, trying to suppress their intrusion, or by engaging in other safety behaviours. 
The cognitive-model states that the interpretation, or appraisal, of the obsession mediates the 
behavioural outcomes, not the obsession itself. 
 
Self-perpetuating mechanisms in OCD 
The intrusion-compulsion pattern in OCD is maintained through a number of means. 
These processes can lead intrusions to become obsessions, can contribute to the repetitive nature 
of compulsions, and may result in worsening of OCD symptoms over time. 
No natural terminus to the compulsive behaviour. Rachman (2002) observed that the 
concern expressed in the obsession is vague and future-oriented, which means that it is not 
possible to establish with certainty that harm has been avoided. Thus, compulsive behaviours 
have no natural terminus. Indeed, Szechtman & Woody (2004) posited that people with OCD 
uniquely are unable to achieve the internal, felt sense we normally rely on to signal that danger 
has passed and safety behaviours can be terminated. Consistent with this, Salkovskis, Millar, 
Gregory, & Wahl (2017) found that in those with OCD the decision to terminate washing 
behaviour was more effortful and required more evidence than in both anxious and non-clinical 
comparison groups. 
Learning mechanisms. Safety behaviours, like compulsions, are reinforced because they 
reduce distress in the short term, which increases the probability of engaging in the safety 
behaviour in future instances of the intrusion (Hodgson and Rachman, 1972). Salkovskis, 
Thorpe, Wahl, Wroe, & Forrester (2003) found that when people with OCD responded to an 
intrusion with a neutralizing thought they had more discomfort and more urges to neutralize later 
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on than those who did not neutralize. In addition to the negative reinforcement of distress 
reduction, engaging in safety behaviours eliminates the opportunity to learn that the thought is 
innocuous, even when not acted upon (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009).  Thus, the sufferer 
is likely to continue avoiding situations that elicit obsessions or compulsions, without learning 
that the intrusion is harmless on its own. 
Mood-appraisal spiral. Negative interpretations of intrusions are thought to lead to a 
decline in one’s mood, whether that be sadness, anxiety, or distress of some other kind. Adverse 
mood is theorized to result in further ritualization (Beech & Liddell, 1974), which can lead to a 
“mood-appraisal spiral”, whereby negative interpretation leads to worsened mood, which leads 
to compulsions, which have been associated with an increase in intrusions (Salkovskis, 1999). 
Compulsions can serve as reminders of obsessions, perpetuating the symptoms even further 
(Abramowitz, Taylor, & Mckay, 2009). 
 Impact of compulsions on beliefs. The more one performs compulsions, the greater 
sense of responsibility one feels, and an increase in perceived harm probability is observed 
(Bucarelli & Purdon, 2016; Rachman, 2002; Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado, & Lavioe, 2014). In 
addition, compulsions decrease one’s confidence in their memory for the performance of the 
compulsion (Bucarelli & Purdon, 2016; Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010; Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado, & Lavoie, 2014; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; 
van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). In other words, the behaviour that one performs in order to feel 
more certain has the effect of increasing one’s sense of doubt about their own behaviour: this has 
been deemed the “ironic effect” of repetition in OCD. This effect has been seen for perseverative 
checking (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; van den Hout 
& Kindt, 2003) and perseverative attending (van den Hout, Engelhard, de Boer, du Bois, & Dek, 
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2008); thus, van den Hout et al., 2008 summarize the ironic effect as a general perseveration-
uncertainty association. 
However, the ironic effect literature has some important limitations. Most often, the 
effect of checking on certainty has often been explored using a virtual stove (e.g. Boschen & 
Vuksanovic, 2007), which may be less threatening than a real one that can cause actual harm if 
left on. In addition, most often, the checking is artificially induced; that is, experimenters tell 
participants to repeatedly look at a stove (e.g. van den Hout & Kindt, 2003), turn a stove on and 
off (e.g. Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006), or imagine checking the stove (e.g. Radomsky 
& Alcolado, 2010) a set number of times. The relationship of natural checking to certainty is 
rarely explored. Furthermore, ironic effect has been explored for physical checking and mental 
checking, but less often for visual checking; less is known about the impact of paying attention 
to threatening stimuli on certainty for a check. Lastly, it is not clear why, despite repetition in 
OCD, certainty is achieved in over half of all compulsive episodes (Bucarelli & Purdon, 2015). 
This suggests that the repetition-doubt cycle must be broken in some cases, but the 
circumstances under which this occurs is not clear.  
Impact of compulsions on memory. Rachman (2002) wrote that impaired memory 
consolidation during a check may occur due to high levels of affective arousal during the 
performed compulsion. Van den Hout and Kindt (2003) posited that increased familiarity with a 
particular set of behaviours (i.e. the compulsion) leads to conceptual processing of the act, while 
perceptual processing is suppressed, which diminishes the vividness of the memory for 
perceptual details of the behaviour, which is the very information relied upon to establish that a 
task was done correctly. Thus, the effect of checking on memory can help explain the ironic 
effect of repetition: those who check more actually have poorer memory for the sensory details 
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of the action, leading to less certainty it has been done properly. This can evoke concerns about 
mental deterioration and produce general doubts about one’s cognitive abilities (Rachman, 
2002). This, in turn, can exacerbate concern about ability to avoid harm and lead to increasingly 
strict criteria that have to be met in order to establish certainty. In this way, washing one’s hands 
one time may no longer be enough in order to feel certain that one has eliminated contamination, 
and unusual criteria may be relied upon in an attempt to gain that certainty (Richards, 1995, 
1997; Wahl, Salkovskis, & Cotter, 2008). 
 Attention deployment. People with OCD may be hypervigilant to both internal and 
external threat stimuli. Internally, those with OCD are thought to be more cognitively self-
conscious, making them more likely to detect intrusions (Cohen & Calamari, 2004; Salkovskis, 
1985). This can contribute to greater distress over the lack of mental control that the sufferer 
perceives themselves to have. It may also lead to increasing attempts to suppress one’s 
intrusions, which has been shown to lead to an increase in thought occurrence (Abramowitz, 
Tolin, & Street, 2001). Thought recurrences, in turn, are associated with increasingly negative 
appraisals of the thought’s meaning and importance (Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2007). 
 Those with OCD may also find stimuli related to their obsessions to be threatening, and may pay 
more attention to these (Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1999). Paying more attention to intrusion-
related cues could lead to an increase in obsessive thoughts (Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
 
Attention in OCD 
As previously noted, patterns of attentional deployment may play a role in the 
maintenance of OCD. However, the literature on attention in OCD is inconsistent. 
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 Attention theory. Poser and Peterson’s (1990) seminal paper on visual attention 
identified three patterns of attentional deployment: disengaging attention from a stimulus, 
shifting attention, and engaging attention with a new stimulus. Posner and Peterson viewed these 
patterns as being the product of one of two types of processing, automatic and effortful. 
Automatic processing is stimulus-driven and quick, and is often described as “bottom-up” 
attention. Luria (1973) called it “involuntary orienting”. It is akin to when a stimulus simply 
catches our eye and automatically draws our attention. Effortful processing, on the other hand, is 
motivation or goal-driven, and involves purposefully directing our attention to a specific 
stimulus (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Because executive function is implicated, is often 
referred to as “top-down” attention. 
 Attention in anxiety. Studies of the role of attention in anxiety have typically compared 
the tendency for anxious individuals to pay more attention to threatening stimuli than neutral 
stimuli, or compared people high in anxiety to a control group in the extent to which they attend 
to threatening stimuli. Various theories have been posited to predict how anxiety influences 
attentional deployment. The vigilance theory of attentional biases purports that for people high in 
trait anxiety, threat cues have early and ready capture of attention. That is, the bottom-up, 
involuntary attentional system has a low threshold for threat detection and capture. This is called 
“facilitated attention” (Cisler & Koster, 2010). The maintenance model suggests that people high 
in trait anxiety are more likely to maintain attention on a threat stimulus once it has been 
detected (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), which Cisler and Koster (2010) refer to as “difficulty 
disengaging”, but at some point during exposure to the threat stimulus they also may deliberately 
start to avoid attending to it, which Cisler and Koster (2010) refer to as “attentional avoidance” 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
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Attentional avoidance is much less well understood than facilitated attention and 
difficulty disengaging. Cisler & Koster (2010) noted that attentional avoidance may be driven by 
one’s emotion regulation goals in that moment. There is evidence that attentional deployment 
can be influenced by the goal of the participant; for example, Vogt, Lozo, Koster, and De 
Houwer (2011) found that those who touched an object they found disgusting were more likely 
to look at stimuli relevant to cleanliness than those who did not touch a disgust object, implying 
that their desire to become clean influenced their attentional deployment. See Table 1 for a 
summary of the components of attention and their relationship with attention biases. 
 
Table 1. Attentional biases in anxiety and their related attentional components 
Attentional 
bias 








Shifting attention and 
engagement with a new stimulus 
Maintenance  Paying more attention 
to threat stimuli over 
time 
May be a combination 
of bottom-up and top-
down processing  
Difficulty disengaging with a 
stimulus 
Avoidance Greater avoidance of 
threat stimuli over time 
Top-down, goal-driven 
system 
Lack of re-engagement with a 
stimulus  
  
Attention in OCD. If those with OCD are assumed to exhibit similar features as those 
with anxiety disorders, we would expect that people with OCD show similar attentional biases to 
threat. However, we cannot assume that what we know about attention biases in anxiety is an 
exact parallel to what is experienced by those with OCD because there are many 
phenomenological and neurological differences between the two (Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & 
Fineberg, 2006; Stein et al., 2010). Rachman (2002) proposed that those with OCD are likely to 
pay more attention to threat cues than those without OCD. Studies investigating attention in 
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OCD use one of a set of paradigms: a dichotic listening paradigm, an emotional Stroop task, a 
dot probe task, an inhibition of return paradigm, or a free-viewing paradigm.  
The dichotic listening paradigm involves presenting participants with a threat cue and a 
neutral or other cue in the other ear, simultaneously. Participants are instructed to focus on the 
non-threat words, and then asked to try to recall as many threat words as they can. An attentional 
bias is said to be present when fear-related words are remembered more readily in one group 
than another, as this indicates that those words are particularly salient for the listener (Muller & 
Roberts, 2005).  
The emotional Stroop task involves presenting participants with emotionally salient 
words in different colours and asking that participants say the colour of the word, rather than the 
word itself. Longer reaction times to state the colour of the word is interpreted to mean that the 
word is especially distracting, indicating an attention bias (Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
In the dot probe task, participants are presented with a threat word or image on one side 
of a screen, and a neutral word or image on the opposing side. These stimuli are removed, and a 
target is presented on either the same side as the threat (congruent trial) or the same side as the 
neutral cue (incongruent trial). Participants are asked to press a key to indicate on which side the 
target was presented. An attentional bias is thought to be present if the participant responds to 
congruent trials faster than incongruent trials (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt & Oakman, 
2014). 
In the emotional inhibition of return paradigm, a neutral or threatening image or word is 
presented on one side of the screen. Then, a target is presented either on that same side (valid 
trial) or the opposing side (invalid trial). Participants are asked to press a key to indicate on 
which side the target was presented. Attentional bias is said to be present if there is a quicker 
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response to valid trials (indicating facilitated attention) or if there is a slower response on invalid 
trials (indicating difficulty disengaging) when a threat stimulus is presented before the target 
than when a neutral stimulus is presented before the target (Moritz et al., 2009). 
Studies comparing people with OCD to those without OCD on these paradigms has 
yielded quite mixed findings. See Table 2 for a summary of this research. 
 
Table 2. Studies of attention in OCD 
Article Method Result 
Foa & McNally, 1986 Dichotic listening (word 
detection in non-dominant ear) 
Fear-relevant words detected more before 
treatment than after treatment 
Foa et al., 1993 Emotional stroop task (RT) Those with OCD (washing type) took longer 
to name contamination words than neutral 
words 
Lavy, Van Oppen, & 
Van Den Hout, 1994 
Emotional stroop task (RT) Those with OCD took longer to name OCD-
related words than neutral words 
Direnfeld, Pato & 
Roberts, 2001 
Emotional stroop task (RT) Response delay to OCD words correlated 
with total number of OCD symptoms; delay 
decreased from pre- to post-treatment 
Kampman, Keijsers, 
Verbraak, Naring, & 
Hoogduin, 2002 
Emotional stroop task (RT) No group differences (OCD, Panic Disorder, 
controls) on delay in naming OCD or general 
threat words 
Kyrios & Iob, 1998 Emotional stroop task (RT) No difference between OCD and controls on 
naming OCD and neutral words 
Tata, Leibowitz, 
Prunty, Cameron, & 
Pickering, 1996 
Dot-probe task (RT) OCD contamination group quicker to respond 
to a dot in the place of contamination words 
than a social phobia group 
Harkness, Harris, Jones 
& Vaccaro, 2009 
Dot-probe task (RT) No difference between OCD checking 
participants and matched controls on reaction 
time to checking or washing stimuli 
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Table 2 (Continued). Studies of attention in OCD 
Amir, Najmi, & 
Morrison, 2009 
Dot-probe task (RT) More attention to OCD stimuli in first block, 
attenuation over trials 
Moritz et al., 2009 Inhibition of Return (IOR) Those with OCD took longer to respond to 




Free viewing of images (ET) 
 
High contamination fears group paid more 
attention to disgusted and fearful expressions; 
were quicker to orient to fearful faces only 
Bradley, Hanna, 
Wilson, Scott, Quinn, 
& Dyer, 2016 
Free viewing of images (ET) No group difference on speed of orienting to 
stimuli; OCD severity predicted frequency 
and duration of fixations over time 
Armstrong et al., 2012 Free viewing of scenes (ET) High contamination fears group were quicker 
to orient to threat; no difference on time spent 
looking at threat 
Bucarelli & Purdon, 
2016 
In-vivo stove checking task (ET) Those with OCD paid less attention to 
threatening stimuli than an anxious control 
group 
Note. RT= reaction time data used; ET= eye tracking data used 
 
These studies suggest that those with OCD may have an attentional bias towards threat 
cues that are relevant to their central obsessional concern. However, there are also a number of 
null findings in the literature that challenge the idea that attentional biases to threat play an 
important role in the persistence of obsessional problems (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2012; Harkness, 
Harris, Jones & Vaccaro, 2009; Kyrios & Iob, 1998). Due to the conflicting findings, attention 
processes in OCD warrant more attention. 
Limitations of attention paradigms. Reaction time measures, such as dot-probe tasks, 
stroop tasks, and inhibition of return paradigms, are limited, both in design, and in the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them. Tasks like the dot-probe and spatial cueing paradigms 
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require a response, such as a key press, from the observer, thus pulling the attention of the 
participant away from the stimuli they are meant to be attending to. Participant attention to the 
keyboard is not ideal when one is purely aiming to study attention to threat. 
In addition, the data yielded from these tasks do not allow us to distinguish between the 
different attentional processes that may be implicated (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Most 
authors using these techniques use inferential reasoning to try to discern the attentional processes 
at play; however, most often, no conclusive statements can be made about this. For example, a 
longer reaction time on a Stroop task may indicate that the participant is more distracted by a 
word (i.e. difficulty disengaging is at play), or that they are avoidant of the word (i.e. attentional 
avoidance is at play). Evidence for this can be seen in a study by Lavy & van den Hout (1994), 
who asked participants to avoid reading certain types of information, and stroop reaction times 
increased, indicating that avoidance can have the same effect as difficulty disengaging. 
Additionally, during these tasks, more than one attentional process may be at play, depending on 
the duration of stimulus appearance—in short, interpretations of reaction time data are difficult.  
Furthermore, these paradigms rely on a pre-determined set of stimuli (most often OCD-
related words or images) that are thought to be relevant to the participant. However, evidence 
from some studies (e.g. Tata, Lebowitz, Prunty, Cameron, & Pickering, 1996) suggest that 
attention biases may only be found within the realm of what is idiosyncratically threatening to 
each participant; that is, stimuli must reflect the particular concerns of the participant.  
Lastly, the dot probe task has been found to be wholly unreliable, with reliability 
estimates centering around 0 (Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, 
Hyatt & Oakman, 2014). 
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Measuring attention using eye tracking. Due in part to these limitations, as well as 
advancing technology and available methodologies, researchers have begun to use eye tracking 
technology to study attentional processes. Eye trackers may be used while participants are 
engaging in a reaction time task, or during free-viewing paradigms. Eye trackers assess overt 
attention, in the form of eye movements, to gather information about the participants’ visual 
attention; in this way, eye tracking data goes beyond reaction times, telling us about dynamic 
changes in attention over time. Using this data, researchers can make conclusions about the three 
attentional processes: quicker time to orient to threat stimuli indicates facilitated attention, more 
time attending to threat indicates difficulty disengaging, and eye fixations away from a stimulus 
can indicate attentional avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010). In contrast to the dot probe task, the 
use of eye movement indices over a longer time course (5000 ms) has been shown to have 
excellent reliability (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt & Oakman, 2014).  
This method, too, has its limitations. Some authors argue that overt attention is only half 
of the picture, and that covert attention is important to study in these populations as well 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). In addition, the argument that stimuli must be idiosyncratic to the 
individual still applies when using eye tracking technology. 
 
Bucarelli & Purdon, 2016 
Bucarelli & Purdon (2016) addressed many of the limitations in the ironic effect of 
repetitive checking and attentional deployment to threat by tracking eye movements during a 
task involving an actual stove. Participants with OCD whose primary concern was checking, and 
a clinical control group of participants with another anxiety disorder (but no OCD), used a stove 
while wearing a portable eye tracker, allowing participants to engage in both physical and visual 
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checking as they normally would. Participants were asked to boil a kettle of water, then turn off 
the burner and place a pot of dry rice on the same burner used to boil the kettle, and then leave 
the kitchen to join the researcher several rooms away. Around the stove were an equal number of 
non-flammable items (coffee mugs, a glass salt shaker, and metal cooking utensils) and “threat” 
items (flammable items such as matches, paper towels, paper coupons).   
The researchers examined attention to the stove, attention to flammable items, and 
attention to non-flammable items during a “pre-check” phase (the time between when the stove 
was turned on and the kettle boiled) and “check” phases (the time between when the kettle was 
removed and the participant left the kitchen). Pre- and post-task ratings of harm and 
responsibility were taken, as were post-task ratings of confidence in memory for having turned 
off the stove, and certainty that the stove was, in fact, off. This paradigm allowed Bucarelli and 
Purdon to examine the extent to which looking at the stove (that is, visually checking the stove) 
was associated with subsequent memory confidence. 
A key finding was that the anxious control group did exhibit an ironic effect of checking 
the stove knob, lights, and burners, such that greater fixations on these cues was associated with 
less confidence and certainty that the stove was off. Contrary to hypotheses, the OCD group did 
not show this effect, but it was considered noteworthy that those with OCD had a significantly 
less fixation time on threat items than did the anxious controls. The authors hypothesized that 
those with OCD have experience getting caught in an attention-uncertainty cycle, and 
strategically avoid paying attention to threatening items in order to avoid getting caught in this 
cycle. However, motivation to attend to threat and to avoid attending to threat was not directly 
explored within this paradigm. 
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There is certainly evidence for behavioural and cognitive avoidance in OCD. Those with 
OCD tend to avoid coming into contact with cues that may induce obsessions (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013); behavioural avoidance may be effective in the short term to 
reduce anxiety, but is associated with increased anxiety over time (Purdon, 2007). Cognitive 
avoidance, in the form of thought suppression, is also common in OCD (Rachman & Hodgson, 
1980), and is often commonly used to get rid of the obsession in order to avoid having to do the 
compulsion (Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2005). Attentional avoidance, however, is only 
beginning to be investigated in anxiety disorders, and has not yet been investigated explicitly in 
OCD. Interestingly, Moritz et al. (2009) found that those with OCD took longer to respond to 
targets preceded by an OCD-related stimulus. The authors interpreted this to suggest that people 
with OCD were “more distracted” by these images; however, an alternative explanation may be 
that people with OCD were deliberately trying to avoid the images. Thus, attentional avoidance 
may occur in OCD, but further investigation is indeed necessary. 
 
The present study 
The theory on attention in OCD states that those with OCD are more likely to pay 
attention to threat than those without OCD (Rachman, 2002). However, Bucarelli and Purdon 
(2016) found that those with OCD paid less attention to threat than anxious controls. Meanwhile, 
there are robust findings which suggest that when people with and without anxiety disorders 
repeat an action, such as visually checking a stove to determine whether or not it is off, they have 
less, rather than more, confidence that the stove is off (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003).  In 
contrast, Bucarelli and Purdon (2016) found that the more anxious controls looked at a stove, the 
less certain they felt that it was turned off properly, whereas in those with OCD, this was not the 
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case. These intriguing findings lead the authors to hypothesize that those with OCD did not show 
an ironic effect of prolonged checking on certainty because, knowing that threat cues can 
increase their doubt, they strategically avoided attending to the threatening items, which may 
have reduced the need for perfect certainty the stove is off, thereby dodging a pattern of 
prolonged checking. Participants high in anxiety but without a history of prolonged checking 
may not have had the experience to recognize that attention to threat may lead to prolonged 
checking. 
One possibility is that avoidance of threat may improve post-task certainty. In attending 
to threat cues, people may begin to envision numerous possibilities by which harm could occur 
(e.g., the matches could spill onto the burner, one could inadvertently knock one into the vicinity 
of the burner, the paper towels may get blown over onto the burner as one leaves the kitchen, 
etc.) which further increases perceived harm and concomitant importance of perfect certainty 
that everything is safe before leaving. Afterwards, if they cannot conjure a perfect image of the 
threatening items as being safely away from the burner the may begin to doubt whether the stove 
is safe. When people have had this experience, and have become stuck in a check-doubt-
repetition cycle, they may implicitly recognize that attending to threat heightens their appraisal 
of harm, increases the number of stimuli they need to check perfectly, and results in repeated 
checking that fosters doubt, rather than certainty. They may thus choose to simply avoid 
attending to threat, particularly when they are not fully responsible for the environment, as is the 
case in a lab setting. Although they may still check longer than people without checking 
concerns due to over-estimations of harm and responsibility, avoiding threat may result in greater 
confidence that the check was done properly. If this is the case, this may provide an explanation 
for why many compulsions end in certainty, despite the ironic effect. 
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The purpose of the current study was to elaborate and extend Bucarelli and Purdon by: 1) 
examining the relationship between check duration and OCD-relevant trait and state appraisals; 
2) investigating whether people high in checking concerns avoid threat cues, as assessed by both 
self-report and actual visual attention; 3) and exploring whether avoidance is associated with 
increased post-check certainty. In addition, we aimed to collect information on how people knew 
it was okay to end the check (their “termination criteria”). Only one study has investigated 
termination criteria for checking, finding that more criteria were used by obsessional checkers 
than controls (Salkovskis, Millar, & Gregory, 2017). However, this study was done 
retrospectively, not in-lab, and we are interested in exploring the type of criteria that is reported 
shortly after a check. 
To address these questions, we used Bucarelli and Purdon’s in-vivo stove-checking 
paradigm to examine checking in people high and low in checking behaviour. Participants were 
asked to rate how much they attended to and avoided attending to threat stimuli, and were 




1. In line with the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD, those high in checking concerns 
will have higher levels of trait responsibility, lower levels of trait memory, sensory, and 
cognitive confidence, higher levels of state responsibility and state harm estimation.  
2. Due to hypothesized overestimations of harm and responsibility, those high in checking 
behaviour will have longer check duration than those low in checking behaviour. 
Accordingly, check duration will be influenced by trait and state appraisal ratings. 
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3. Those high in checking behaviour will report greater motivation to avoid threat and the 
proportion duration of eye fixations on threat will be fewer than those of participants low 
in checking behaviour. 
4. Greater subjective and actual avoidance of threat will be associated with higher post-task 
certainty in those high, but not low, in checking behaviour. 
5. Those in the HCB group will use more criteria to end their check than those in the LCB 





















A between-subjects design was used with those high and low in checking concerns. The 
study involved 4 steps: a) pre-task scale completion, b) checking induction with eye-tracker, 
which included a pre-check phase (time between when the stove was turned on and when the 
kettle boiled) and a check phase (time between when the stove was turned off and the participant 
left the kitchen), c) post-task scale completion, and d) an interview. See Procedures section for 
details. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from University of Waterloo’s participant pool and took part 
in this hour-long study in exchange for partial course credit. The study was advertised as an 
exploration of checking using eye-tracking technology. An analogue sample was used, with 
participants high and low in checking concerns. Analogue samples are thought to be both 
appropriate and valuable in the study of OCD, since checking symptoms are present in non-
clinical populations, and OCD symptoms are thought by many to be dimensional, rather than 
categorical. Previous analogue studies have found phenomenological similarities between those 
with OCD and non-clinical samples of those who endorse OCD concerns (Gibbs et al., 1996; 
Abramowitz et al., 2014). 
Participants were pre-screened using the Concerns about being responsible for harm, 
injury, or bad luck subscale (“Responsibility subscale” hereafter) of the Dimensional Obsessive-
Compulsive Scale, scores on which are associated with checking behaviour (DOCS; see 
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measures section). To ensure equal sampling in the extreme ranges of responsibility concerns, 
those who scored 0.5 standard deviations below the student mean for this subscale and 0.5 
standard deviations above the OCD mean for this subscale were able to participate. A total of 
103 participants (age range= 18-26 years, mean age= 20.52 years, SD= 1.79 years) completed 
the study. See Table 3 for demographic information about this sample. 
Participants were re-administered the DOCS in-lab. The score on their Responsibility 
subscale in-lab determined their group membership for analyses. Scores of 0-2 on this subscale 
marked the bottom quartile of participants (those Low in Checking Behaviour; LCB; n=30), and 
scores of 8 or higher marked the top quartile (those High in Checking Behaviour; HCB; n=29). 
Because participants’ in-lab scores did not match their pre-screen scores, the sample size used 
for analysis was smaller than the sample of participants who completed the study.  
Table 3. Demographic information, whole sample (n=103) 
Characteristic Category n % of sample 
Gender Identity Male 27 24.8 
Female 72 66.1 
Other 4 9.1 
Sex Assigned at Birth Male 27 24.8 
Female 76 69.7 
Primary Ethnicity Aboriginal 1 0.9 
Black/African American 3 2.8 
East Asian 28 25.7 
Middle Eastern 4 3.7 
South Asian 15 13.8 
Southeast Asian 8 7.3 
West Indian/Caribbean 1 0.9 
White/Caucasian 38 34.9 
Other 3 2.8 




Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010). The 
DOCS is a 20-item, self-report measure used to assess OCD symptom and severity. It is scored 
using 4 subscales: Concerns about Germs and Contamination; Concerns about being Responsible 
for Harm, Injury, or Bad Luck; Unacceptable Thoughts; and Concerns about Symmetry, 
Completeness, and the Need for Things to be “Just Right”. These subscales have been confirmed 
through the use of factor analysis across diagnostic groups. Each subscale consists of 5 items, 
asking about time spent on these concerns, avoidance of triggers, distress, impairment, and 
mental control over these concerns. Items are scored on a range from 0, indicating an absence of 
that symptom, to 4, indicating an extreme presence of that symptom. Internal consistency is 
excellent, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.86-0.94 for the Responsibility subscale, and 
0.90-0.93 for the total score. The DOCS demonstrates good convergent validity, correlating well 
with other scales that measure OCD symptoms, such as the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-
Revised (OCI-R) and Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS). Of particular 
importance in our study, the DOCS Responsibility subscale significantly correlates with the 
OCI-R Checking subscale. The DOCS was also able to discriminate those with OCD from those 
with other anxiety disorders and from a non-clinical population of students. In our sample, the 
reliability of this scale was excellent (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.93, Spearman-Brown Coefficient for 
split half reliability= 0.85). 
Memory and Cognitive Confidence Scale (MACCS; Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007). The 
MACCS is a 28-item, self-report scale designed to assess beliefs about memory and other 
cognitive processes. It has four scales: General Memory, Decision-Making, 
Attention/Concentration, and High Standards. Responses range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
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(agree very much). Even when controlling for mood, those with OCD score higher on the 
MACCS, indicating lower levels of cognitive confidence; in this way, the MACCS is able to 
discriminate between those with OCD and community controls. Adequate internal consistency 
has been found using this scale. The MACCS correlates significantly with OCD-related beliefs 
as measured by the OBQ. In our sample, the reliability of this scale was excellent (Cronbach’s 
alpha= 0.92, Spearman-Brown Coefficient for split half reliability= 0.93). This scale was 
included to assess trait memory and cognitive confidence. 
Obsessive Belief Questionnaire – Brief Version (OBQ-44; Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group, 2005). The OBQ-44 is a 44-item, self-report measure for assessing 
beliefs that are thought to be implicated in OCD. Factor analysis revealed three scales: 
Perfectionism and Intolerance of Uncertainty; Importance of Control of Thoughts; and 
Responsibility and Overestimation of Threat. Participants score how much each item reflects the 
way they see the world, from 1 (disagree very much) to 7 (agree very much). Internal 
consistency for the scale was very good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95. The OBQ-44 shows 
convergent validity with the Padua Inventory-Revised (PI-R), another widely used instrument to 
measure OCD severity. The OBQ-44 is able to discriminate between those with OCD, those with 
other anxiety disorders, student controls, and community controls. In our sample, the reliability 
of this scale was excellent (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.96, Spearman-Brown Coefficient for split half 
reliability= 0.92). This scale was included to examine trait beliefs about cognitions.  
Visual-Analogue Scales (VAS; Bucarelli & Purdon, 2016). Visual analogue scales of 
125 mm were used to assess responsibility for harm, estimation of harm, and certainty that the 
task had been done correctly. The scales were anchored on the left by a phrase indicating an 
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absence of that property (e.g. “not at all” or “no harm at all”) and on the right indicating an 
extreme presence of that property (e.g. “extremely” or “100% certain”). Pre-task scales included 
the questions: “imagine what could happen if the stove was left on…” (a) how much harm could 
occur?, (b) how responsible would you feel if harm occurred?, (c) how guilty would you feel if 
harm occurred, and (d) how likely is it that harm will occur? Questions (a) and (d) were 
aggregated to make up the “estimation of harm” scale; questions (b) and (c) were combined to 
estimate “responsibility for harm”. Post-task scales began with the prompt “imagine the status of 
the stove right now…” and asked the same four questions as above, plus two questions about 
certainty: (a) how certain are you that the check has been done properly? And (b) how certain are 
you that harm has been prevented?. These were combined to make up the “certainty” scale. 
iViewXTM HED Portable Eye Tracker. The eye tracker used in this study was a head-
mounted, mobile eye tracker from SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI). It is comprised of an 
outward-facing camera, producing person-perspective video, and an inward-facing eye monitor 
that is calibrated to track the participants’ right pupil. These two inputs are combined to generate 
video footage with a superimposed crosshair that indicates participants’ attention. Then, this 
video can be coded to generate eye tracking indices. This eye tracker was calibrated using 5-
point calibration. Eye tracking data was coded with SMI BeGazeTM Version 2.5 software and 
then exported to SPSS Version 24.0 for further analysis.  
Threat and non-threat items. From left to right, the following items were placed around 
the stove: a metal canister with spaghetti noodles in it, a paper towel roll, a metal tin with metal 
cooking utensils in it, a container of matches, a salt shaker, a paper basket with blank recipe 
cards, stacked mugs, and a jar with wooden spoons. These items were selected to ensure that a 
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range of flammable (paper towels, matches, basket, spoons) and non-flammable (canister, tin, 
salt, mugs) items with approximately equal physical qualities were sampled. These items were 
the same used by Bucarelli & Purdon (2016), but for the present study, they were arranged 
around the stove in approximately symmetrical fashion, to avoid item size and colour from 
pulling participants’ attention to one area for any extraneous reason. See Appendix A for a 
picture of the stove and surrounding items.  
  
Procedure 
Introduction and consent-gathering. Participants were brought into the lab and the 
stove task was explained. Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions and were 
provided with consent forms. All participants provided consent to participate; one participant 
declined to have their interview audio recorded (notes were taken in-lab in lieu of this recording).  
Pre-task scales and task set-up. Participants were asked whether they wear corrective 
eyewear (glasses or contacts), and whether they were wearing colour contacts or eye makeup. 
Researchers ensured that participants wore eyewear if they normally would for a kitchen task to 
ensure ecological validity. Glasses, colour contacts, and heavy eye makeup are also known to 
impair calibration (Xu & Merritt, personal correspondence), so these variables were collected for 
researcher awareness purposes. Participants were then given the MACCS, OBQ-44, and DOCS 
to complete in paper format, while the researcher waited in another room. Once completed, the 
participants were explained the stove task in full detail (see Checking Induction for more 
details). Participants then completed the pre-task VAS. Next, eye tracker fitting and calibration 
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was completed. If calibration was unsuccessful, participants completed the rest of the study as 
they normally would, wearing the eye tracking for consistency.  
Checking induction. Before leaving the room, the researcher turned on all burners to 
demonstrate stove functioning, leaving participants to turn off the three unnecessary burners. The 
participants were asked to boil a pre-measured amount of water in the kettle (on the fourth 
burner), then take the kettle off the stove when it whistled. Participants were told to ensure the 
stove was off, and then put a prepared pot of dry rice onto the burner they just finished using. If 
participants asked when it was okay to put the rice on, or if they should put the rice on right 
away, researchers answered that they should put the rice on when they feel comfortable doing so. 
Participants were instructed to take off the eye tracker and leave the room after this task, meeting 
the researcher in another room. 
Post-task scales and interview. When the task was complete, participants completed the 
post-task VAS. After this, the researcher asked participants for their subjective ratings, from 1-
10, of their attention to, and avoidance of, the items around the stove, for both the pre-check and 
post-check phases. The pre-check phase was explained to participants as the time between when 
the researcher left the room and when the kettle boiled. The post-task phase, then, constituted all 
the time between when the kettle boiled and when the participant left the room. Specifically, 
participants were asked “to what extent did you feel the need to pay attention to [item]” and “to 
what extent did you feel the need to avoid paying attention to [item]?”. If attention or avoidance 
was endorsed (rating > 1), the researcher queried about participant motivation to attend to or 
avoid items (e.g. “why do you think you felt the need to pay more attention to that?” or “why do 
you think you wanted to avoid looking at that?”). It was assumed that subjective attention to 
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stove would yield ratings at or close to ceiling, so this data was not collected. Similarly, looking 
at the stove was necessary to complete the task, so data on subjective avoidance of the stove was 
not collected. For clarity, these questions were administered back in the kitchen, while looking at 
the items around the stove; however, previous to this, participants did not know that they would 
be re-entering the kitchen. This ensured that participants truly felt responsible for turning the 
stove off correctly before leaving.  
Termination criteria. The person-perspective eye tracker video was reviewed with 
participants. At the point in the video when the participant put the rice on the stove, they were 
asked how they knew it was okay to put the rice on the stove at that time. At the end of the video, 
participants were asked how they knew it was okay to leave the kitchen when they did. These 












Data was inspected for outliers. Outliers were defined as data points three standard 
deviations or further from the group mean and discontinuous from the rest of the data. Outliers 
were replaced with the second most extreme data point in that group (Kwak & Kim, 2017). The 
number of outliers adjusted for each variable is as follows (if the variable is not listed, there were 
no identified outliers): pre-task responsibility (n= 3), check duration (n= 2), subjective avoidance 
of threat (n= 1), subjective attention to threat (n= 2), post-task certainty (n= 2). 
Demographics 
There were no differences between the High Checking Behaviour (HCB; M= 20.37, SD= 
1.950) and Low Checking Behaviour (LCB; M= 20.35, SD= 1.623) groups on age, t(43)= -.042, 
p= .967), gender identity (χ2(2)= 2.146, p= .342), sex assigned at birth (χ2(1)= .005, p= .942), or 
self-identified ethnicity (χ2(7)= 6.860, p= .444). Both the HCB and LCB group were majority 
female and culturally diverse, with less than 32% self-identifying as white in each group. See 

















LCB HCB  
n % n % χ2 value (df) p value 
Gender identity Female 22 73.3 20 69.0 2.146 (2) .342 
Male 8 26.7 7 24.1 
Other 0 0 2 6.9 
Sex assigned at 
birth 
Female 23 76.7 22 75.9 .005 (1) .942 
Male 7 23.3 7 24.1 
Ethnicitya Black/African American 0 0 2 6.9 6.860 (7) .444 
East Asian 8 26.7 9 31.0 
Middle Eastern 1 3.3 1 3.4 
South Asian 5 16.7 6 20.7 
Southeast Asian 4 13.3 2 6.9 
White/Caucasian 8 26.7 9 31.0 
Other 3 10 0 0 
Decline to answer 1 3.3 0 0 
Note. aNo respondents self-identified as Aboriginal or West Indian/Caribbean. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Appraisals 
We hypothesized that those in the HCB group would have higher levels of trait 
responsibility, lower levels of trait cognitive confidence, higher levels of state responsibility and 
state harm estimation than those LCB. A multivariate analysis of variance, with group as the 
dependent variable and appraisals as the dependent predictors, was significant, Wilk's λ (4, 47)= 
.568, p < .001. Between-subjects effects revealed significant differences between groups on all 
appraisal measures: the MACCS, OBQ-44, and pre-task harm and responsibility ratings, with 




























17.659 <.001 1.182 




35.108 <.001 1.673 











4.826 .033 0.579 
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. MACCS= Memory and 
Cognitive Confidence Scale; OBQ-44= Obsessive Beliefs Scale-Brief Version. aUnivariate F. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Check duration and appraisals 
We hypothesized that those in the HCB group would spend more time in the kitchen after 
the kettle had boiled than those in the LCB (“check duration”), and the amount of time would be 
influenced by trait and state appraisal ratings. 
Useable data. Out of the 29 participants in the HCB group, 3 videos were corrupted and 
check time could not be extracted. Of the 30 participants in the LCB group, one participant’s 
video was not recorded because calibration failed.  
Group differences. An independent samples t-test revealed that the HCB group checked 






 Table 6. Check time by group  
Group M (SD) t-value (df) p-value Cohen’s d 
LCB 42.241 (39.035) 2.308 (31.332)a .028 0.662 
HCB 91.970 (103.471)    
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. aLevene’s test was 
significant, so equal variances was not assumed. 
 
Influence of appraisals. To analyze the influence of appraisals on check duration, a 
linear regression was performed, with group on step one, appraisal on step two, and the 
interaction of group and appraisal on step three (in an effort to test a fully specified model and 
ensure that no effects were missed due to an untested interaction). This linear regression was 
performed separately with each trait appraisal measure (MACCS, OBQ-44) and state appraisal 
measure (pre-task harm and responsibility). For each regression, the entry of group on the first 
step resulted in a significant R2 change. Regression results are presented in Table 7. 
MACCS. The addition of the MACCS on the second step did not result in a significant F 
change, p= .531; nor did the interaction of group and MACCS on step three, p=.944.  
OBQ-44. Similar to the influence of the MACCS, adding the OBQ-44 to step two did not 
result in a significant F change, p= .100; nor did the OBQ-44 by group interaction on step three, 
p=.297. 
Pre-task harm. Pre-task harm entry into step two did not result in a significant F change, 
p= .096; however, step three did result in a significant change in F, p=.025, such that harm and 
check time were closely related in the HCB group (r= .405, p= .040), but their correlation was 
close to zero in the LCB group (r= .040, p= .838). 
Pre-task responsibility. Pre-task responsibility entry on step two did not result in a 
significant F change, p= .086; nor the interaction of this with group on step three, p=.120. 
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Table 7. Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses of check duration  









































































Note. MACCS= Memory and Cognitive Confidence Scale; OBQ-44= Obsessive Belief Questionnaire; * 
significant F change at p < .025. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Avoidance of threat between groups 
We predicted that those in the HCB group would report more subjective avoidance of 
threat, and would have lower objective attention to threat (as measured by eye tracking statistics) 
than those in the LCB group.  
Subjective avoidance. Attention and avoidance was rated on a 0-10 scale for each item 
around the stove and at two time points: during the pre-boil and post-boil phases.  
Data preparation. For these analyses, ratings across phases were combined, as moderate 
and significant correlations between the phases indicated redundancy (rs from .457 and .707). 
Outcomes of analyses were identical when performed with variables combined or separate. 
Subjective attention to threat was the sum of all ratings for flammable items (paper towels, 
matches, paper basket, and wooden spoons) combined over the pre-boil and post-boil phases. 
 
 34 
Subjective attention to neutral items was the sum of all ratings for non-flammable items (metal 
canister, utensils, salt shaker, and mugs) combined over the pre-boil and post-boil phases. 
Group differences. Independent samples t-tests showed no group differences on self-
rated attention to flammable or non-flammable items, ps > .133. However, there was a significant 
difference between the HCB group (M= 17.190, SD= 17.075) and LCB group (M= 8.900, 
SD=4.180) on avoidance of threat, t(31.237)= -2.542, p= .016, d= 0.684. The difference between 
groups on avoidance of non-flammable items approached significance, t(31.798)= -1.970, p= 
.058, d= 0.530. See Figure 1 for these data.  
Figure 1. Mean attention and avoidance ratings in each group. Error bars (±) represent standard error of 


























Objective avoidance. Using the eye tracker, data on attention to flammable items 
(“threat”) was collected. Available statistics were the amount of time spent looking at threat 
(fixation duration) and the number of times one looked at a threat item (fixation count). 
Data preparation. Using these statistics, proportion variables were created. Proportion 
fixation duration was generated by summing the duration of fixations on each flammable item, 
and dividing this sum by the total fixation time collected for each participant. In the same way, 
proportion fixation count was generated by summing the total fixation count for each participant 
on flammable items, and dividing this sum by the total number of fixations identified for that 
participant.  
Useable data. Out of the 29 participants in the HCB group, 2 were not able to be 
calibrated, 2 had eye tracking ratios below 50% (so were excluded), and 3 videos were corrupted 
and not able to be coded, leaving 22 participants with valid eye tracking data. Out of the 30 
participants in the LCB group, 2 were not able to be calibrated, and 8 had low tracking ratios (≤ 
50%), leaving 20 participants with valid eye tracking data.  
Correlation with subjective avoidance. Across groups, self-rated attention to threat 
correlated with proportion fixation duration (r=.610, p= .003; and r=.684, p= .001 for the HCB 
group and LCB group, respectively) and proportion fixation count (r=.708, p< .001; and r=.585, 
p= .007 for the HCB group and LCB group, respectively); thus, participants were relatively 
accurate when reporting how much they paid attention to threat. However, self-rated avoidance 
of threat was not correlated with self-rated attention or objective fixation duration or count in 
either group (ps > .135). Thus, participants’ desire to avoid may not have matched their actual 
attention patterns. Lastly, across groups, proportion fixation duration and proportion fixation 
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count were highly correlated (r=.884, p< .001; and r= .936, p< .001 for the HCB group and 
LCB group, respectively). See Table 8 for correlational data. 
 
Table 8. Correlations of subjective and objective measures of attention to threat 
 Self-rated 
attention to threat 
Self-rated 







- .284 .610* .708** 
Self-rated 
avoidance of threat 
.111 - .314 .321 
Fixation duration 
on threat 
.684* .299 - .884** 
Fixation count on 
threat 
.585* .298 .936** - 
Note: HCB group correlations above the diagonal and LCB group below the diagonal; fixation 
duration= proportion fixation duration, fixation count= proportion fixation count. ** indicates p < .001, 
* indicates p < .01. 
 
Group differences. Independent samples t-tests showed no significant differences 
between the HCB group and LCB group on proportion fixation duration on threat items, t(32)= -
1.512, p= .140; but a trend towards a higher proportion fixation count in the HCB group was 
observed, t(32)= -1.827, p= .077. See Table 9 for fixation values by group. See Appendix B for 
fixation values for the stove and neutral items. Whereas the HCB group looked at threat more 







 Table 9. Fixation durations and counts by group   
 
 




















-1.512 (32) .140  
Proportion fixation 





-1.827 (32) .077  
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Avoidance of threat and certainty  
We hypothesized that subjective and objective avoidance of threat would be associated 
with higher post-task certainty in the HCB group, but not the LCB group. 
Group differences on certainty. An independent samples t-test revealed that the HCB 
group had significantly lower post-task certainty than the LCB group, t(47.212)= 3.155, p= .003, 
d= 0.842. See Table 10 for these data. 
 
 Table 10. Post-task certainty by group  
Group M (SD) t-value (df) p-value Cohen’s d 
LCB 235.267 (19.656) 3.155 (47.212)a .003 0.842 
HCB 213.914 (30.901)    
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. aLevene’s test was 
significant, so equal variances were not assumed. 
 
Data preparation. In looking at the impact of objective avoidance on certainty, we chose 
to use proportion fixation durations on threat (rather than proportion fixation count) because we 
were interested in the amount of time spent looking at threat, knowing that less time may 
indicate attentional avoidance. In addition, fixation duration and fixation count were highly 
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correlated, indicating redundancy (rs of .884 and .936, for the HCB group and LCB group, 
respectively; see Table 8 for this data).  
Predicting certainty. To explore the effect of attention to threat on post-task certainty, a 
linear regression was performed with group on step one, proportion fixation duration on threat on 
step two, and the interaction of group and attention to threat on step three. See Table 11 for 
regression data. Step one was not significant, p=.069; but step two did result in a significant F 
change, p= .018, such that more fixation time on threat predicted less certainty; and step three 
also resulted in a significant F change, p=.023. This significant interaction indicated that 
proportion fixation duration on threat and certainty were closely negatively correlated in the 
HCB group (r= -.608, p= .003), but their correlation was close to zero in the LCB group (r= -
.027, p= .910). Thus, in the HCB group, those who paid less attention to threat had higher post 
task certainty, whereas this was not the case for those in the LCB group. 
A similar linear regression was performed with group on step one, subjective avoidance 
of threat on step two, and the interaction of group and avoidance on step three. Step one was 
significant, p= .002; but step two did not result in a significant F change, p= .675, and neither did 
step three, p= .497. Thus, attentional avoidance, when measured objectively, predicted certainty 
in the HCB group; however, this was not the case for subjective avoidance. 
Table 11. Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses of post-task certainty  





Proportion fixation duration on threat 

















Subjective avoidance of threat 













Note. * significant F change at p < .024. 
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Reasons to avoid: thematic analysis. Through our post-task interview, we collected 
qualitative information about why participants were attending to, and avoiding paying attention 
to threat. After reviewing participants’ responses, conceptual categories were generated. When 
analyzing reasons to attend to items, three groups of reasons arose: curiosity (e.g. thinking about 
the function, properties of the item), location (e.g. item was close to kettle, directly in line of 
sight), and danger (e.g. the desire to monitor a potentially dangerous item). When analyzing 
reasons to avoid attending to items, two general reasons were reported: distraction (e.g. item was 
pulling their attention away from the task), and worry (e.g. the desire to look away because the 
item was anxiety-provoking). See Table 12 for a breakdown of the frequency with which each of 
these reasons were endorsed.  
Table 12. Frequency of endorsement of reasons to attend to and avoid threat by group 
 Rationale LCB (n) HCB (n) 
Attend to threat Curiosity 8 5 
 Location 1 0 
 Danger 6 8 
 Both location and danger 1 2 
Avoid looking at threat Distraction 6 7 
 Worry 1 5 
 Both distraction and worry 0 2 
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. 
 
A chi-squared test revealed no group difference on reasons to attend to flammable items 
(χ2(4)= 2.295, p = .682) nor on reasons to avoid flammable items (χ2(3)= 6.413, p = .093). 
Within the category of worry, specific reasons for avoidance included: avoiding paying attention 
to flammable items in order to avoid the urge to use them (n= 1), avoid the urge to move them 
(n= 2), avoid thinking about the danger they pose (n= 8), and avoid getting more anxious (n= 1). 
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Note that these ns represent our whole sample, including participants who do not belong to either 
the LCB or HCB group. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Termination criteria 
Thematic analysis. After completing the stove checking tasks, participants’ eye tracking 
videos were reviewed with them. At the point in the video when they placed the dry rice on the 
stove, participants were asked how they knew it was okay to do so. Their answers constituted 
their reported termination criteria for putting the rice on. At the point in the video when they took 
the eye tracker off and left the kitchen, participants were asked how they knew it was okay to do 
so. Their responses represented their termination criteria for leaving the kitchen. Both sets of 
termination criteria (when to put rice on the stove and when to leave the kitchen) were 
categorized using thematic analysis, with guidance from the four categories used by Wahl et al., 
2008 and Salkovskis et al., 2017. Six categories arose in our sample. See Table 13 for each 
category and corresponding examples. The three external/objective categories and the three 
internal/subjective categories were summed to create the variables “external criteria” and 
“internal criteria” for each decision (rice on, leave kitchen). Additionally, the total number of 
criteria used to know when to put the rice on and to leave the kitchen was totaled from the sums 









Table 13. Termination criteria categories and examples 
Category Criteria Type Examples 
External 
criteria 
External responsibility* Decision based on instructions given by researcher or with 
the belief that the researcher is ultimately responsible if 
harm occurs 
 External perceptual Decision based on a perceptual experience, such as seeing 
the knobs in the off position, feeling that the burners are 
cool, or hearing the click of the knob 
 External intellectualizing* Decision based on reasoning processes, such as a belief that 
the stove wasn’t dangerous enough to start a fire 
Internal 
criteria 
Internal feeling/mood Decision based on an internal feeling, certainty, or sense of 
satisfaction 
 Internal rules/memory Decision based on internal rules or memory-related cues, 
such as remembering that the stove was off 
 Internal effort Decision based on feeling as if one tried hard enough or 
checked long enough 
Note. * indicates that this group was not used by previous researchers but was generated through 
thematic analysis of our sample.  
 
 Group differences. There were no group differences on total number of criteria used for 
either decision, ps > .080, nor on number of internal or external criteria used, ps > .210, nor were 
there differences in use of any single category of criteria, ps > .107. Thus, in contrast to our 
hypothesis, the HCB group did not use significantly more criteria to determine when to put the 















Table 14. Mean number of termination criteria types by group 
  M (SD) 
Decision Criteria Type LCB (n=17) HCB (n=24) 
Put rice on External criteria 1.471 (1.125) 1.292 (0.690) 
 Internal criteria 0.177 (0.393) 0.333 (0.482) 
Leave kitchen External criteria 1.778 (1.086) 2.143 (1.044) 
 Internal criteria 0.222 (0.506) 0.357 (0.559) 
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. 
 
Criteria and check length. Exploratory post-hoc analyses of criteria type were 
performed to explore whether certain criteria were associated with longer checks or less 
certainty. Check length was significantly negatively correlated with the number of external 
responsibility criteria used to decide when to put the rice on (r = -.338, p= .004) and significantly 
positively correlated with the number of external intellectualizing criteria used to decide when to 
leave the kitchen (r = .328, p= .002). Post-task certainty was negatively correlated with the 













The aim of this study was to further explore attention to, and avoidance of, threat items 
during a stove checking task with those high and low in checking concerns.  
Our first aim was to analyze the relationship between trait and state appraisals and check 
duration. We found that the high checking behaviour group had higher trait appraisals of 
responsibility, and lower confidence in memory and cognitive abilities, with large effect sizes. 
Their state appraisals of harm and responsibility were higher than the low checking behaviour 
group, with medium effect sizes. In addition, those with checking concerns had significantly 
longer checks than those without significant checking concerns. However, in contrast to our 
prediction, trait appraisals and state responsibility did not explain variance in check duration 
beyond that explained by group. This finding is in line with emerging findings that once a 
compulsion begins, situational factors (such as mood, context, and state appraisals) may be more 
important than trait beliefs (Purdon, 2018). In line with this hypothesis, state harm appraisals did 
interact with group to predict check duration in our sample. Those in the checking concern group 
with higher harm appraisals had longer checks, whereas those in the low concern group had 
similar check lengths no matter their pre-task appraisals. The high checking behaviour group had 
appraisals that have been shown to be elevated in those with OCD (Rachman, 2002), and higher 
appraisals of harm seemed to be especially important in predicting longer check durations. It 
may be the case that the greater the perceived harm, the more important it seemed to participants 
to ensure the stove was off, and therefore the more careful they were (e.g., waiting until the 
burner was cold rather than simply checking the position of the stove knob and whether or not 
the light was on). 
 
 44 
A major goal of this study was to explore whether those with checking concerns engage 
in attentional avoidance, and if so, their reasons for doing so. We found that those high in 
checking concerns endorsed more motivation to avoid threat items than those low in checking 
concerns. The HCB group had a nonsignificant tendency to avoid neutral items more than those 
in the LCB group. This general avoidance (of both threat and neutral items) may be a by-product 
of the stove set-up in our study; flammable and non-flammable items were spaced closely 
together, so selective avoidance of flammable items may have been difficult. It may also suggest 
that participants high in checking concerns are motivated to stay very focused on the information 
they need to determine whether the stove is off, rather than attending to other information in the 
environment. Especially given their lower levels of trait cognitive confidence (as measured by 
the MACCS), it is possible that those HCB felt more vulnerable to distraction. Another 
possibility is that those HCB envision ways that harm can occur, even with non-flammable 
objects. Future research might examine how external stimuli evoke catastrophic thinking. 
There was no significant difference between groups on time spent looking at threat; 
however, fixation count approached significance, with the high checking behaviour group 
appearing to look at threat more often than those in the low checking behaviour group. This may 
be an indication that those with checking concerns were drawn to look at threat (facilitated 
attention), but did not let their attention linger on threat. After seeing threat, those HCB may 
quickly look away, such that the overall time spent looking at threat is no different from those in 
the LCB group. This may be an indication that those HCB avoided paying prolonged attention to 
threat. However, we did not analyze the course of attentional deployment over time; future 
studies may benefit from using a more fine-grained look at attention patterns in order to better 
discern whether attentional avoidance is present or not. 
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In terms of the function of avoidance, self-reported avoidance was not predictive of 
increased certainty after the task, so feeling motivated to avoid looking at threat does not seem to 
help participants feel more certain that safety was achieved. Perhaps this is because self-rated 
avoidance did not seem to be related to actual attentional deployment. Actual attentional 
deployment, as measured by fixation durations, was predictive of post-task certainty in the high 
checking behaviour group, such that those who looked more at threat were less certain after the 
check. Whereas Bucarelli & Purdon (2016) found that those with OCD did not exhibit an ironic 
effect of attention, we did find that the high checking behaviour group’s certainty was negatively 
impacted by their attention to threat.  
This difference may be explained in part by the difference in samples, as our study did 
not use a clinical sample. Although the HCB group had significantly different questionnaire 
scores than those in the LCB group, the average HCB scores on the MACCS and OBQ scales 
were somewhat lower than those in the OCD sample from Bucarelli & Purdon, 2016. In our 
sample, 75% of the HCB met the recommended cutoff score of 21 on the DOCS questionnaire, 
the score shown to best differentiate those with OCD from those with other anxiety disorders; 
thus, it is unlikely that all of our HCB participants would meet the severity and impairment 
requirements to be considered for a diagnosis of OCD. Consequently, our sample may be among 
those who are the most susceptible to the ironic effect of attention, since they have OCD-like 
concerns and doubts, but are not familiar enough with the insidious effects of attention to 
successfully avoid them. 
We found moderate correlations between self-reported attention to threat and fixation 
number and duration on threat, indicating that self-reported attention may be an accurate 
indicator of actual attention (even if self-reported avoidance is not). Meanwhile, consistent with 
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the hypotheses of Cisler and Koster (2010), we did find that some participants avoided paying 
attention to threat in order regulate their emotions. However, numbers for those endorsing 
avoidance were low, and those providing reasons for doing so were even lower. Although 
behavioural avoidance has been shown to provide relief in the short term (Harding, 2013), the 
issue as to whether attentional avoidance functions in the same way is a possible direction of 
future study.  
Lastly, we collected information about how participants knew when to end their check. In 
contrast to previous findings, the HCB group did not use more criteria than the LCB group; 
however, the number of criteria used to decide when to leave the kitchen approached 
significance, and may have reached significance with a larger sample. Interestingly, the use of 
intellectualizing to decide when to end a check appeared to have a negative impact on check 
duration and certainty, whereas externalizing responsibility was associated with a shorter check 
duration. This is a novel finding, as the relationship between criteria and check length has not 
previously been investigated; however, it is in line with theory that check intensity is related to 
responsibility concerns (Rachman, 2002). It also corresponds to previous research that 
experimenter presence reduces discomfort in those with OCD (Roper & Rachman, 1976), and 
that when responsibility is manipulated, memory confidence is affected (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 
2007). 
As with every study, this study is limited by several factors: we did not ask, nor assess, 
whether participants had a previous diagnosis of OCD or an anxiety disorder; thus, this 
information is not available for analyses. In addition, our group sample sizes were relatively 
small; as previously noted, the more exploratory pieces of our study, such as termination criteria 
and reasons for avoidance of threat, were underpowered, and warrant more exploration with 
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larger samples. Lastly, we measured check length as a proxy for the extent of participants’ 
checking. However, check length may not have been directly related to check behaviour: a 
longer check length may mean that participants are checking the stove and surrounding areas, or 
it may mean that participants are just standing in the kitchen, with their mind on other matters. 
We could not examine physical checking (e.g. putting hand over burners, turning knobs) for all 
participants, as our only video of the check was from participants’ perspective, and often did not 
provide a full view of the participants’ hands. Future studies could examine physical checking by 
taping participants from a different angle. In addition, the phenomenology of stove checking may 
be such that participants check, leave the area, doubt ensues, and then they later to check. Thus, a 
future measure of checking could be providing participants with the option of returning to the 
kitchen.  
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the literature on attention in OCD by 
being the first to explore attention avoidance from the perspective of the individual performing 
the check. Those with checking concerns do endorse avoiding threatening items for a variety of 
reasons, including concerns about the danger of the item and balancing the competing demands 
of the task. Given this initial finding, the impact of avoidance on check phenomenology is an 
area that warrants more attention. 
All in all, while Bucarelli & Purdon (2016) provided information about those with OCD, 
our study may provide insight into how OCD could develop: when responsibility and harm 
beliefs are present, one may look more at threat, but at the same time feel anxious about looking 
at threat and want to avoid it. This may result in longer checking time, and less certainty that 
harm was avoided. Given time, these preliminary concerns may lead to longer checking, more 
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0.779 (32) .476  
Proportion fixation 





1.354 (32) .185  
Proportion fixation 





0.563 (29.462a) .589  
Proportion fixation 





1.683 (37.262a) .101  
Note. LCB= low checking behaviour group; HCB= high checking behaviour group. aLevene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances was significant, so equal variances were not assumed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
